Application of adversarial risk analysis model in pricing strategies with remanufacturing by Deng, Liurui & Ma, Bolin
Journal of  Industrial Engineering and Management
JIEM, 2015 – 8(1): 1-20 – Online ISSN: 2013-0953 – Print ISSN: 2013-8423
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1223
Application of  Adversarial Risk Analysis Model in
Pricing Strategies with Remanufacturing
Liurui Deng1, Bolin Ma2
1College of  Economics and Management, Hunan Normal University (China)





Purpose: This paper mainly focuses on the application of  adversarial risk analysis (ARA) in the
pricing strategy with remanufacturing. We hope to obtain more realistic results than classical
model. In fact, the classical Stackelberg model believes that since OEMs are the monopoly
position, they know the pricing strategy of  remanufacturers in the second period. However, the
development of  remanufacturing industry shakes OEMs’ monopoly position and makes
remanufacturers become stronger and stronger, so, in fact, OEMs don’t know the pricing
strategy of  remanufacturers in the second period. Hence, the classical Stackelberg model isn’t
suited for reality. In this paper, we suppose that the OEMs don’t know the pricing strategy of
remanufacturers and recovery cost and only know their own information. Based on these
assumptions, we predict the pricing strategy of  remanufacturers from OEMs’ point.
Furthermore, we build OEMs’ own pricing strategy based on the predicted the
remanufacturers’ pricing strategy, which is called OEMs’ 1-order ARA model. Similarly, we look
ourselves as remanufacturers and forecast OEMs’ pricing strategy. Based on the forecasted
OEMs’ pricing strategy, we create the remanufacturers’ own pricing strategy. Simulated results
make us find ARA model gets more profit than classical Stackelberg model.
Design/methodology/approach: In order to gain more actual research, we apply adversarial
risk analysis to the pricing strategy with remanufacturing. As OEMs, they don’t the recovery
cost and the pricing strategy of  remanufacturers, so they have to analyze and predict the pricing
strategy of  remanufacturers and based on this predicted the pricing strategy of  remanufacturers
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build their own pricing strategy. The pricing strategy of  OEMs is called 1-order ARA model of
OEMs. To similar, remanufacturers build their own pricing strategy based on predicting the
pricing strategy of  OEMs. In the other words, remanufacturers build their own 1-order ARA
model. Moreover, we use Monte Carlo simulation to numerically analyze and compare the 1-
order ARA models with the classical Stackelberg models.
Findings: We research the OEM’s 1-order ARA model with the uncertainty rate of  recovery.
That is, as OEMs, they don’t know the recovery cost of  remanufacturers and only know their
own unit product cost c. So, they suppose the recovery cost is τc(0 < τ < 1) and τ satisfied on
an uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Based on this assumption, OEMs forecast the pricing strategy
of  remanufacturers. Furthermore， their own the pricing strategy which is called OEM’s 1-
order ARA model. Similarly, as remanufacturers, they don’t know the unit cost c and only know
the recover cost τc . Hence, they suppose C is random variable and satisfied on an uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. With this assumption, remanufacturers forecast the pricing strategies of
OEMs. Moreover, remanufacturers create their own the pricing strategies based on the
forecasted OEMs’ pricing strategies. Besides, by Monte Carlo simulation, we can come to the
conclusion that pricing strategies based on 1-order ARA model have advantage over than the
classical model regardless of  OEMs and remanufacturers.
Research limitations/implications: We discuss OEMs and remanufacturers’ 1-order ARA
models are more practical than classical Stackelberg pricing strategies. In particular, on the one
hand, the rate of  recovery changes because of  development of  remanufacturing industry,
improvement of  new machines, disassemble-ability or other un-predicted reasons. As for
OEMs, it is impossible to accurately know the rate of  recovery. So, OEMs don’t know the
exactly pricing strategies of  remanufacturers. Hence, the OEM’s 1-oreder ARA model is more
practical than the classical Stackelberg model and has advantage over the classical pricing
strategies in profit. On the other hand, the unit production cost is not fixed but rather changed.
Production technology and process improvement causes this cost to change. Similar to OEM,
as for remanufacturers, they have no way to know exactly the unit production cost.
Consequently, remanufacturers have more disadvantages if  they use the classical pricing
strategy than they use remanufacturers’ 1-order ARA model. In our simulating analysis, we can
come to the coincident conclusions. In general, the research on application of  ARA implies that
we can get more actual results with this kind of  modern risk analysis method and ARA can be
extensively in pricing strategies of  supply chain. Moreover, the thought and method of  building
ARA model can be widely applied to other strategies in all kinds of  economic field, such as
investing strategy, the problems about auction, bidding strategies, and so on.
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Originality/value: Our research makes the pricing strategies of  OEMs and remanufacturers
be more actual than classical Stackelberg model and help OEMs and remanufacturers to get
more profit. Furthermore, we improve the application of  ARA in remanufacturing industry.
Meanwhile, inspired by this analysis, we can also create different ARA models for different
parameters. Furthermore, some results and analysis methods can be applied to other pricing
strategies of  supply chain and other economic field.
Keywords: pricing strategy, remanufacture, original equipment manufacturer, adversarial risk analysis
1. Introduction
1.1. Research Background
With the deterioration of the environment, more governments have taken various measures to
improve the remanufacturing industry development and more people strengthen their
protecting environment sense and are willing to buy remanufactured products. So, the
remanufacturing industry has developed recently. Moreover, the remanufacturing industry has
own advantages over other classical industry and has more market share than before.
All kinds of the problems related to remanufactured products have attracted attention. For
example, Savaskan discusses the problem about choosing the appropriate reverse channel
structure for the collection of used products from customers (Savaskan, 2011). Jaber and El
Saadany create the production, remanufacture and waste disposal model with lost sales (Jaber
& El Saadany, 2009). Agrawal, Atasu and Ittersum experimentally investigate the effect of
remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products (Agrawal, Atasu & Ittersum,
2010). King, Burgess, Ijomah and McMahon discuss the importance of remanufactured
products for reducing waste and protecting environment (King, Burgess, Ijomah & McMahon,
2006). Some researchers focus on the policy influences. Webster and Mitra examine the impact
of take-back laws within a manufacturer/remanufacturer competitive framework and develop a
general two-period model to investigate questions of interest to policy-makers in government
and managers in industry (Webster & Mitra, 2007). Based on the general researches, many
investigators begin to explore dynamic models, especially two-period models. Hiities and
Yüksela address the design of automobile engines for remanufacture with quality function
deploymet (Yüksela, 2010). Swaminathan characterizes the production quant self-selection and
explores the effect of various parameters in the Nash equilibrium on the duopoly environment
(Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006, 2010). Meanwhile, other researchers are more interested in the
pricing strategies for dynamic models. Wu pays attention to the effects of disassemble-ability
and interchangeability on the price competition (Wu, 2013, 2012b). Besides, he considers price
and service between new and remanufactured products (Wu, 2012a). Mitra focuses attention
on revenue management for remanufactured products and develops a pricing model to
maximize the expected revenue from the recovered products (Mitra, 2007).
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In order to study pricing strategies, we will carve up markets and manufacturers. As for the
market, we divide it into the primary and green segments. We believe that the primary
consists of primary consumers as well as the green market is composed of green consumers
(Atasu & Wassenhove, 2008; Atasu Guide & Wassenhove, 2008). Primary consumers deem
that the new products have higher value than the remanufactured products. Nevertheless, the
remanufactured products are treated with the same value as new ones by green consumers.
So, green consumers prefer remanufactured products to new ones. Because there are not
remanufactured products in the first period, the primary and green consumers are not
different. However, in the second period, the green consumers are more willing to buy the
green products than new ones, which are benefit for environment.
Suppose that there are two kinds of manufactures, which are original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) and remanufacturers. There are game relations between them (Wu,
2013, 2012a, 2012b; Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006, 2010; Majumder & Groenevelt (2001). The
pricing strategies will directly affect each other's the market share and profits. Meanwhile,
OEMs design for disassembly influences on the costs of OEMs and remanufacturers. To be
specific, the high disassemble-ability makes it easy to repair, cleaning, inspection for OEMs.
Moreover, the high disassemble-ability reduces the recover cost of remanufacturers. However,
the design for high disassemble-ability increases the fixed cost of OEMs. So, in order to save
fixed cost and raise the remanufacturers' cost, OEMs always will choose to the design for low
disassembly. This measure makes remanufacturers erode the competitiveness as well as OEMs
strengthen competitiveness.
Many elements affect on pricing strategies, such as, the proportion of green consumers in the
whole market, the rate of used products being available to be remanufactured, the change of
the market sizes, and so on. In this article, we consider parameters are fixed values except
that the design for disassembly is two levels.
Besides, we apply a novel method to pricing strategy model, adversarial risk analysis (ARA). In
the next section, we will generally introduce adversarial risk analysis. Adversarial risk analysis
suggests a new perspective to study risk analysis, which combines statistical methodology and
game theory (Rios-Insua, Rios & Banks, 2009). ARA more closely press to actual conditions
and more accurately forecast information than traditional risk analysis. Thus, Adversarial risk
analysis is extensively applied in many area, such as economics, finance, management,
engineering, environment, military, etc. (McAfee & McMillan, 1996a, 1996b; Rothkopf, 2007;
Velu & Iyer, 2008; Heyes, 2000; Winterfeldt & O'Sullivan, 2006).
Since adversarial risk analysis is only just beginning, most people only carefully treat on
simultaneous play. There is little research dynamic game, except sketching the formulation of
the Defend-attack model (Brown, Carely, Salmeron & Wood, 2006). There are many the
sequential-move games in the practical life however, for instance, chess, the guaranteed
annual wage contract between labor and management (Leontief, 1946), enterprise merge and
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acquisition, used car market game (Akerlof, 1970, 2002; Akerlof & Dickens, 1982; Bond,
1982), job market signaling (Spence, 1973). Studying the dynamic play is not adequate, so
the practice applications of adversarial risk analysis are limited.
In this paper, we research the mixed play game. Particularly, it is 2-period dynamic game. In
the second period, there is a simultaneous play.
1.2. Introduction of Related Parameters 
Before we explore the model, we introduce the related parameters. The rate of used product
being available to be remanufactured is noted as α. Suppose the market has two periods. The
first period consists of s1 consumers. And, green and primary consumers are indifferent, since
there is no remanufactured product. Therefore, in this period, the market is the primary
market. The market scale in the second period is s2 consumers. In this period, the market is
divided into primary and green segments. Primary segment consists of primary consumers who
are willing to pay for green products β times as high as primary ones (0 < β < 1). That is, if we
let pn, the price of new products be accepted by primary consumers in the second period, then
the primary consumers prefer to pay βpn or less money for green products. Otherwise, the
primary consumers won't buy the green products. While, the green consumers think green
products as the same as primary ones and prefer green products. Assume that the percentage
of green consumers in the whole market is λ and the primary consumers' proportion is 1 – λ.
The quantity of remanufactured product is restricted by the quantity of new product in the first
period.
We suppose the utility of consumers in the first period is U1 = Ø – p1, where Ø uniform [0,1]
(Atasu & Wassenhove, 2008) and p1 is the price of new product in the first period. The utility of
primary and green consumers are respectively Un = Ø – pn and Ur = βØ – pr, where pr is the
price of green products in the second period. qr, qn and q1 respectively are the demand
quantity of remanufactuered products, new products in the second period and the demand
quantity of new products in the first period. Further suppose that μ is the proportion in the
collected end-life-cycle products which are used by remanufacturers.
Remanufacturers' pricing strategies are high G and low S. The rate of discount is δ.
Now, it is needed to think that the remanufacturing problem under restricted condition is as
follows:
(1)
where j  {S, G}.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we study OEMs’ 1-order ARA model.
Particularly, as an OEM, they don’t the rate of recovery of remanufacturers, so they have to
estimate remanufacturer's pricing strategy. Moreover, based on the forecasted results, OEMs
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build their own pricing strategy, which is called OEM's 1-order ARA pricing strategy model. In
the next section, we discuss remanufacturers’ 1-order ARA model. Especially, considering from
remanufacturers’ point, since remanufacturers don’t know the unit production cost, we have to
predict OEMs’ pricing strategies. Then, we research remanufacturers’ own pricing strategies
based on the forecasted OEMs’ pricing strategies. In section 4, we numerically simulate by
Monte Carlo method. Through generating a series of random parameters, we simulate reality
and find that our 1-order ARA models have advantage over classical pricing strategies for both
OEMs and remanufacturers. At last, we talk about the conclusion and the further research.
2. OEMs Build Their Own Pricing Strategy - OEM’s 1-order ARA Pricing Strategy Model
In reality, the rate of recovery changes because of development of remanufacturing industry,
improvement of new machines, disassemble-ability or other un-predicted reasons. As for
OEMs, it is impossible to accurately know the rate of recovery. So, OEMs don’t know the
exactly pricing strategies of remanufacturers.
In this section, considering from OEMs’ point, we only know the OEMs’ unit production cost c
and don’t know the remanufacturers’ recovery cost τc(0 < τ < 1). So，OEMs don’t know the
pricing strategy of remanufacturers and have to predict remanufacturers’ pricing strategy.
Based on this predicted pricing strategy, we build OEM’s own pricing strategy. That is, it is
called as 1-order ARA model of OEMs.
We firstly consider two cases，which are remanufacturers accept low-pricing strategy and
high-pricing strategy. Especially, if remanufacturers accept low-pricing strategy, OEMs predict
the concrete pricing strategy of remanufacturers. Similarly, if remanufacturers accept high-
pricing strategy, OEMs estimate concrete pricing strategy of remanufacturers. Then, OEMs
create their own pricing strategy based on these predicted pricing strategy of remanufacturers.
2.1. OEM Estimate Remanufacturer's Pricing Strategy Model
Suppose that OEM's unit production cost is c. OEM estimate that remanufacturer's recovery
cost is τc(0 < τ < 1) and τ satisfied on a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Correspondingly, the
fixed cost of OEM is νc(0 < ν < M).
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2.1.1. OEMs Estimate the Pricing Strategy of Remanufacturers under the
Remanufacturer’s Low-Pricing Strategy
We firstly think about the case pr < βpn. At this time, OEM believe remanufacturer's the low-
pricing strategy is as follows:
Proposition 2.1. (i) when
(2)
remanufacturers choose the low-pricing strategies.
(ii) If
(3)
i.e. the remanufacturing is unbound by collection, then remanufacturer's optimal pricing
strategy is
(4)
Otherwise,i.e. the remanufacturing is bound by collection,
(5)
Proof: When , it is easy to see that
As for OEM, he thinks that remanufacturer’s the object function is 
So, 
We come back to the Equation (1). We only need to let
in order to get the maximal value of .
Detailedly, 
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That is,




Where η = (1 – λ)/(1 – β).
Applying Equation (4) to (6), we can get Equation (3).
We apply Equation (4) to pr ≤ βpn we can obtain Equation (2).
When , from , we can get Equation (5).
2.1.2. OEMs Estimate the Pricing Strategy of Remanufacturers under the
Remanufacturer’s High-Pricing Strategy
Now, we pay attention to the case pr > ppn In other words, we should use the high pricing
strategy.





i.e. the remanufacturing is unbound by collection.
Otherwise, i.e. the remanufacturing is bound by collection,
(9)
Proof: When remanufacturers accept the high pricing strategy, it is not difficult to state that
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and
OEM estimate that
It is easy to see that we only need to let
to achieve the optimal solution of . That is,
It is Equation (7). Noting  we have
(10)
Applying Equation (7) to (10), we get (8).
When  we can get Equation (9) with .
2.2. OEM Build Their Own Pricing Strategy Based on Predicted Remanufacturer’s
Pricing Strategies - OEM’s 1-order ARA Pricing Strategy Models
2.2.1. OEM’s 1-order ARA Pricing Strategy Model when Remanufacturers Choose the
High-Pricing Strategy
We first discuss the case of remanufacturer’s high pricing strategy.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose remanufacturers choose the high pricing strategy.
OEM’s pricing strategies is .
Proof: When the remanufacturer use the high-pricing strategy, the market demand of new
products in the second period is 
Therefore, the utility function of OEM
Let  and .
Then, .
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2.2.2. OEM’s1-order ARA Pricing Strategy Model when Remanufacturers Choose the
Low-Pricing Strategy
Theorem 2.4. (i) When remanufacturers choose the low pricing strategy and remanufacturing
is unbound by collection, OEMs’ pricing strategy is 
(ii) When remanufacturers choose the low pricing strategy and remanufacturing is bound by
collection, OEMs’ pricing strategy is 
where
Proof: At first, we consider that what response the OEM should be when the remanufacturer
use the low-pricing strategy. The market demand of new products in the second period is 
Therefore,
Let .
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Hence,
When remanufacturing is unbound by collection, noting Theorem 2.1, we can
When remanufacturing is bound by collection, we prove similarly except for .
3. Remanufacturers Build Their Own Pricing Strategy - Remanufacturer’s 1-order
ARA Pricing Strategy Model 
In fact, the unit production cost is not fixed but rather changed. Production technology and
process improvement causes the cost to change. Similar to OEM, as for remanufacturers, they
have no way to know exactly the unit production cost.
In this section, considering from remanufacturers’ point, we don’t know the OEMs’ unit
production cost c and only know the remanufacturers’ recovery cost τc(0 < τ < 1). So,
remanufacturers don’t know the pricing strategy of OEMs and have to predict OEMs’ pricing
strategy. Based on this predicted pricing strategy of OEMs, we build remanufacturers’ own
pricing strategy. That is, it is called as 1-order ARA model of remanufacturers.
Similar to the above, firstly, we also consider two cases，which are remanufacturers accept
low-pricing strategy and high-pricing strategy. Especially, if remanufacturers accept low-pricing
strategy, remanufacturers predict the concrete pricing strategy of OEMs. Similarly, if
remanufacturers accept high-pricing strategy, remanufacturers estimate concrete pricing
strategy of OEMs. Then, remanufacturers create their own pricing strategy based on these
predicted pricing strategy of OEMs.
3.1. Remanufacturers Estimate the Pricing Strategy of OEMs
3.1.1. Remanufacturers Estimate the Pricing Strategy of OEMs under the
Remanufacturer’s Low-Pricing Strategy
Proposition 3.1. ( i ) When remanufacturers choose the low pricing strategy and
remanufacturing is unbound by collection, OEM’s pricing strategies are 
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(ii) When remanufacturers choose the low pricing strategy and remanufacturing is bound by
collection, OEM’s pricing strategies are
where
Proof: At first, we consider that what response the OEM should be when the remanufacturer
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When remanufacturing is unbound by collection, noting Theorem 2.1, we can
When remanufacturing is bound by collection, we prove similarly except for .
3.1.2. Remanufacturers Estimate the Pricing Strategy of OEMs under the
Remanufacturer’s High-Pricing Strategy
Proposition 3.2. If remanufacturers accept high-pricing strategy, OEM’s pricing strategies is 
This proposition can be proved by method similar to Proposition 2.2.
3.2. Remanufacturers Build Their Own Pricing Strategy Based on Predicted OEM’s
Pricing Strategies - Remanufacturers’ 1-order ARA Pricing Strategy Models
3.2.1. Remanufacturers’ 1-order ARA Pricing Strategy Model when Remanufacturers
Accept Low-Pricing Strategy
Now, as for remanufacturer, we build their own pricing strategies model. To begin, we research




remanufacturers choose the low-pricing strategies.
(ii) If
(13)
i.e. the remanufacturing is unbound by collection,
the remanufacturer’s optimal pricing strategy is 
(14)
Otherwise, i.e. the remanufacturing is bound by collection,
(15)
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Proof: When , it is easy to show that
And OEM thinks that remanufacturer’s the object function is 
We come back to the Equation (1). We only need to let
in order to get the maximal value of .
Detailedly, 
That is,





Applying Equation (14) to (16), we can get Equation (13).
We apply Equation (14) to pr < βpn, we can obtain Equation (12).
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When 
from
and Theorem 3.2, we can get Equation (15).
3.2.2. Remanufacturers’ 1-order ARA Pricing Strategy Model when Remanufacturers
Accept High-Pricing Strategy
Now, we pay attention to the case 
In other words, we should use the high pricing strategy.





i.e. the remanufacturing is unbound by collection.
Otherwise, i.e. the remanufacturing is bound by collection,
(19)
Proof: we can see that
And
It is easy to show that we only need to let
to achieve the optimal solution of . That is,
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It is Equation (17). Noticing
we have
(20)
Applying Equation (17) to (20), we can get Equation (18).
When .
we can get Equation (19) from .
4. The Numerical Simulation
In this section, we simulate the classical pricing strategies and the pricing strategies based on
1-order ARA model and compare with them. Though comparing with simulated results, we find
that the 1-order ARA pricing strategies have advantage over the classical pricing strategies.
Firstly, we investigate the OEM’s pricing strategy. We generate a series of random numbers as
values of τ by Monte Carlo simulation, which lead to the randomness of remanufacturers’
pricing strategies. According to the above results, we can achieve OEM’s pricing strategy based
on 1-order ARA model (Figure 1) and the classical OEM’s pricing strategy (Figure 2). 
Figure 1. The OEM’s pricing strategy based 
on 1-order ARA model
Figure 2. The classical OEM’s pricing strategy
From Figure 1 and Figure 2, we can observe that the utility function value of OEM based on
1-order ARA model is bigger than the classical model, so we can tell that the OEM’s pricing
strategy based on 1-order ARA model is better than the classical pricing strategy. In reality,
the rate of recovery changes because of development of remanufacturing industry,
improvement of new machines, disassemble-ability or other un-predicted reasons. As for
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OEMs, it is impossible to accurately know the rate of recovery. So, OEMs don’t know the
exactly pricing strategies of remanufacturers. Hence, the OEM’s 1-oreder ARA model is more
practical than the classical Stackelberg model and has advantage over the classical pricing
strategies in profit. In our simulating analysis, we can come to the coincident conclusion.
Next, we focus on the remanufacturers’ pricing strategy based on1-order ARA model. Similarly,
we generate a series of random numbers as the values of c by Monte Carlo simulation. Based
on the random values of c, the OEMs’ pricing strategies become random. With the fixed
demand quantity of new and remanufactured products, we obtain the remanufacturers’ pricing
strategies based on 1-order ARA model (Figure 3) and the classical pricing strategies
(Figure 4).
Figure 3. The remanufacturers’ pricing strategy
based on 1-order ARA model
Figure 4. The classical remanufacturers’ 
pricing strategy
Observing the Figure 3 and Figure 4, we have sound reason to say that the remanufacturers’
pricing strategy based on 1-order ARA model is better than the classical pricing strategy, since
the optimal utility function value of remanufacturers is bigger than the classical model. In fact,
the unit production cost is not fixed but rather changed. Production technology and process
improve cause the cost to change. Similar to OEM, as for remanufacturers, they have no way
to know exactly the unit production cost. Consequently, remanufacturers have more
disadvantages if they use the classical pricing strategy than they use remanufacturers’ 1-order
ARA model. Through numerical simulation, we can achieve concordant conclusion. 
5. Conclusion
In Stackelberg model, we suppose that OEMs know the opponent’s pricing strategy. However,
with the development of remanufacturing industry shakes OEMs’ monopoly position and make
remanufacturers become stronger and stronger, so, in fact, OEMs don’t know the pricing
strategy of remanufacturers. To come over this problem, we apply 1-order ARA model to the
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pricing strategies. We analyze the relation between OEMs and remanufacturers and build the
opponent’s pricing strategy model based on the game relationship between them. Ultimately,
we gain the pricing strategy based on the opponents’ pricing strategy model. Since the
opponents will make a rational decision rather than make a random decision, the pricing
strategies based on 1-order ARA model are more practical than the classical model. From the
results of the numerical simulation, we have sound reason to state this conclusion.
In particular, on the one hand, the rate of recovery changes because of development of
remanufacturing industry, improvement of new machines, disassemble-ability or other
un-predicted reasons. As for OEMs, it is impossible to accurately know the rate of recovery. So,
OEMs don’t know the exactly pricing strategies of remanufacturers. Hence, the OEM’s 1-oreder
ARA model is more practical than the classical Stackelberg model and has advantage over the
classical pricing strategies in profit. On the other hand, the unit production cost is not fixed but
rather changed. Production technology and process improvement causes this cost to change.
Similar to OEM, as for remanufacturers, they have no way to know exactly the unit production
cost. Consequently, remanufacturers have more disadvantages if they use the classical pricing
strategy than they use remanufacturers’ 1-order ARA model. 
In general, the research on application of ARA implies that we can get more actual results with
this kind of modern risk analysis method and ARA can be extensively in pricing strategies of
supply chain. Moreover, the thought and method of building ARA model can be widely applied
to other strategies in all kinds of economic field, such as investing strategy, the problems
about auction, bidding strategies, and so on.
6. Further Research
In this article, we only consider that 1-order ARA model as for parameter c. In fact, other
parameters are uncertain rather than fixed numbers. In later research, we will explore that
ARA model as for other parameters, such as wi, ci, β, γ, and so on. Moreover, we study
high-order adversarial risk analysis model to the problems about pricing strategy and think
about application of prospect theory in order to make the research results be more practical
value. Furthermore, in this paper, some results and analysis methods can be applied to other
pricing strategies of supply chain and other economic field.
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